South Korea’s Military Shrinks by 110,00 within 6 years

Aug 10, 2025

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Only 200, 000 Soldiers South Korean Army Still Marching On Foot?

In what increasingly resembles a slow-motion surrender of national defense, South Korea’s military has shed 110,000 personnel over the past six years—plummeting from 560,000 in 2019 to barely 450,000 as of July 2025. Seventeen division-level units have been disbanded or fused into bureaucratic oblivion, and the Army is now a skeletal version of its former self. 

This alarming downsizing was revealed in data submitted to Rep. Choo Mi-ae of the Democratic Party, a member of the National Assembly’s Legislation and Judiciary Committee. The numbers are not just troubling—they’re damning. The Army alone has hemorrhaged over 100,000 troops, dropping from 300,000 to just 200,000. That’s not a strategic recalibration—it’s a strategic retreat.

The so-called “minimum force size” of 500,000, long considered essential under the armistice framework, was breached two years ago. Today, the military is 50,000 short of that benchmark, and the gap is widening. Even desperate measures like loosening conscription standards—raising the active-duty eligibility rate from 69.8% to 86.7%—have barely made a dent. The real culprit? A collapsing birth rate and a generation that sees military service as a burden, not a duty.

Recruitment of officers, the backbone of any professional force, has nosedived. In 2019, the military could fill 90% of its officer slots. By 2024, that figure had cratered to just 50%. Half. That’s not just a staffing issue—it’s a crisis in leadership, continuity, and institutional memory.

To cope, the Ministry of National Defense has been slashing and merging units like a failing corporation trimming fat to survive. From 59 division-level units in 2006, only 42 remain. The latest casualty: the 28th Infantry Division in Dongducheon, Gyeonggi, set to be dissolved this November. Most of the disbanded units were combat-ready formations in strategically sensitive areas like Gangwon and northern Gyeonggi—regions that now face bloated defense zones and overstretched troops.

Redistributing responsibilities to nearby units has created logistical headaches and operational bottlenecks. With fewer boots on the ground and larger areas to defend, the military’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively is increasingly in doubt. Equipment sits idle, talent is scarce, and morale is likely circling the drain.

And here lies the bitter irony: even though South Korea has the industrial muscle to export advanced weaponry across the globe, it no longer has the manpower to operate those weapons at home. The arsenal grows, but the hands to wield it vanish.

The Ministry blames the usual suspects: low birth rates and a declining interest in officer roles, ironically worsened by improved welfare for enlisted soldiers. In other words, making military life slightly less miserable has backfired.

To plug the holes, the ministry is throwing spaghetti at the wall—cutting reserve roles, recruiting more women, offering short-term service perks, and expanding civilian staff for non-combat roles. It’s a patchwork of half-measures that may delay the inevitable but won’t reverse the trend.

Democratic party rep. Choo Mi-ae offered a laundry list of hopeful fixes: selective conscription, better service conditions, and a hybrid manned-unmanned combat system. But critics might ask—are these reforms, or just political window dressing for a military in quiet decline?