Feb. 20 , 2025
This analysis examines the reported activities of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Republic of Korea Army's Cyber Command in manipulating online comments during the 2012 presidential election, alongside the current ultra-right wing regime's control over online platforms and oppression of news media under President Yoon Suk Yeol, particularly following his illegal martial law declaration in December 2024. It draws on various online sources, including news articles, organizational reports, and legislative actions, to provide a detailed overview, reflecting the perspective of experienced journalists without using specific descriptive phrases.
 |
| NIS agent, Kim Ha-Yong, who got caught by democratic party members in 2012 |
Political Context and Current Crisis
As of February 2025, South Korea is in a state of political upheaval following President Yoon Suk Yeol's declaration of illegal martial law on December 3, 2024, which was swiftly overturned by parliament but led to his impeachment on December 14, 2024, and arrest on January 15, 2025 (South Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol arrested as agencies probe his short-lived martial law decree - CNBC). Prosecutors indicted him on January 26, 2025, for leading an insurrection, making him the first sitting president to be arrested and facing potential life imprisonment or the death penalty (South Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol indicted on insurrection charges - The Washington Post). This crisis has been described as a significant challenge to South Korea's democratic framework, with Yoon's actions seen as a throwback to authoritarian practices.
Yoon, from the People Power Party, has been labeled ultra-right wing, a characterization supported by his policies and actions, including illegal martial law declaration, which many see as a threat to decades of hard-won democracy. The opposition Democratic Party, led by figures like Lee Jae-myung, has been vocal in opposing these moves, with Lee gaining prominence during the crisis (Who is Lee Jae-myung, South Korea’s possible next president? - The Economist).
Historical Context: The 2012 NIS and Cyber Command Scandals
To understand the current situation, it's crucial to revisit the 2012 NIS public opinion manipulation scandal, detailed in 2012 NIS public opinion manipulation scandal - Wikipedia. The NIS was found guilty of posting over 1.2 million X posts to support Park Geun-hye in the presidential election, aiming to sway public opinion. This was part of a broader strategy, as noted in Social Media Manipulation of Public Opinion in Korean Elections – The Diplomat, where NIS teams uploaded pro-government comments on social networking services and news sites.
Investigations led by then-prosecutor Yoon Suk Yeol resulted in convictions, including former NIS head Won Sei-hoon, who received a seven-year sentence by 2020 after multiple trials (2012 NIS public opinion manipulation scandal - Wikipedia). The National Assembly passed reforms in 2020 to ban NIS from domestic political interference, a direct response to the scandal.
Additionally, the Republic of Korea Army's Cyber Command was reportedly involved, with a 2013 report by People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) indicating over 15 soldiers worked with online communities and X to promote pro-government topics during the 2012 election (How South Korean Agents Used Social Media to Manipulate Public Opinion and Subvert Democracy, and How the Public is Reacting – Ideas for Peace). Official confirmations were scarce, and searches for "south Korean army cyber command comment manipulation 2012" yielded results focused on North Korean threats rather than domestic activities (Digital Warfare on the Korean Peninsular | GJIA), highlighting the challenge in documenting this aspect.
Current Government Control Over Online Platforms and News Media
Under President Yoon, the government has escalated its control over online platforms and news media, as documented in Freedom House's 2024 report (South Korea: Freedom on the Net 2024 Country Report | Freedom House). Online media outlets critical of the government were punitively fined, had licenses revoked, and offices raided, with journalists facing scare tactics. For instance, in September 2023, a whistleblower reported that Ryu Hee-rim, then KCSC chair, enlisted family and acquaintances to file complaints against Newstapa, a left-leaning outlet critical of Yoon, highlighting regulatory manipulation.
Economic pressures have further weakened media independence, with major advertisers slashing spending and media outlets posting losses in 2023 (South Korea | Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism). This environment has fostered a climate where critical journalism is stifled, with Reporters Without Borders (RSF) noting over half of journalists expressing concerns about declining media freedom under Yoon's administration (South Korea | RSF).
The illegal martial law declaration on December 3, 2024, and the use of troops to attempt take down the National Assembly, as reported in South Korea’s president charged with insurrection over declaration of martial law | CNN, suggest a potential escalation. Social media, particularly X and YouTube, played a crucial role in mobilizing citizens against this move, with rapid dissemination of information enabling swift public response (Is social media new tool for democracy or catalysts of polarization in South Korea? - The Korea Times). However, this also indicates the government's likely intent to control these platforms to suppress dissent.
Parallels and Escalation
The current regime's actions mirror the 2012 NIS(KCIA) scandal but with potentially greater severity. President Yoon, who once led the investigation into NIS manipulation, is now accused of similar offenses, a notable irony noted by observers. The involvement of the military, both in the past with Cyber Command and now with the illegal martial law declaration, suggests a continuity of using state power to control narratives, raising fears of a return to authoritarianism (South Korea’s Immature Professionalism in the Security Sector | Middle East Institute).
The use of regulatory bodies like KCSC and legal sanctions against journalists, as seen in South Korea | RSF, indicates a systematic approach to oppress news media, contrasting with the more covert operations of 2012. This escalation is particularly alarming given the international recognition of South Korea's digital infrastructure, yet its landscape is marked by rigid governmental control (South Korea: Freedom on the Net 2024 Country Report | Freedom House).
Journalists' Perspective
International journalists have been vocal in their condemnation, expressing profound dismay and a sense of betrayal over the government's actions, which they see as a clear assault on democratic principles. Their reporting, as noted in South Korea | RSF, has been critical, highlighting the government's hypocrisy and the decline in media freedom. The illegal martial law declaration and subsequent arrests have been met with outrage, with journalists seeing it as a blatant attempt to subvert democracy, reminiscent of South Korea's authoritarian past (After the president’s arrest, what next for South Korea? - The Economist).
Their skepticism is fueled by the government's use of legal and regulatory tools to target dissent, with defamation laws still allowing up to seven years in prison, potentially leading media outlets to self-censor (South Korea | RSF). This attitude is reflected in their coverage, which has been vital in exposing government tactics and mobilizing public opinion against the regime.
Comparative Analysis and Implications
Comparing the 2012 and 2025 situations, the NIS's activities were more documented and led to legal consequences, while the current regime's actions, involving martial law and military involvement, suggest a broader and more overt attempt at control. The table below summarizes key findings:
This table highlights the escalation from covert online manipulation to overt political and military actions, with significant implications for democracy and media freedom.
Investigative Challenges and Sources
The investigation faced challenges in accessing primary sources, particularly the PSPD 2013 report, which was referenced but not directly accessible through initial searches. Attempts to browse the National Assembly's website (https://www.assembly.go.kr) yielded no readable English text, suggesting language barriers. Searches for Korean language sources were considered but excluded due to the English summarization requirement. Reliance on secondary sources like Wikipedia, Freedom House, and RSF provided a foundation, with web searches confirming current events like Yoon's arrest and media oppression.
Conclusion
The current crisis in South Korea, marked by President Yoon's illegal martial law declaration and the regime's control over online platforms and news media, reflects a disturbing continuity with past scandals like the 2012 NIS manipulation. Journalists' critical stance underscores the threat to democracy, with the government's actions seen as a betrayal of its own principles. The fight for freedom of expression and democratic governance remains critical, with international attention needed to ensure accountability.